The new entity would have its own financial structure, a separate management team and a governing structure that would include organized labor in what Germans call a 'co-determined' model, according to a ranking source familiar with the situation. Three plants would be closed or sold, but assembly operations in Spain, Britain and two of three in Germany likely would survive. A restructured GM Europe would be integrated with GM's global engineering, powertrain and purchasing. In theory, that would give the entity the benefits of global scale even as it would still supply GM with the expertise used to produce the all-new Chevrolet Malibu and the upcoming Chevy Cruze. Is this what GM execs back in Detroit, already $13.4 billion-and-counting in debt to Washington, want? Hardly, considering their deep cultural and financial investment in a 'global GM.' Does the company accustomed to being the 'world's largest automaker' have the leverage or financial wherewithal to preclude what could amount to a government-financed takeover of its European operations? No, as Chief Operating Officer Fritz Henderson repeatedly made clear this week at the Geneva Motor Show in Switzerland. Does a smaller, restructured and potentially independent GM Europe threaten GM's global integration and dismantle a cornerstone of Smith's legacy? It could do both, depending on how much control GM is forced to cede in exchange for the government money it says it needs by sometime next month. This isn't what Smith had in mind after the Soviet Union dissolved, China opened itself to foreign investment, Latin America stabilized and the onetime head of GM-International concluded the only way GM could compete with the Toyota juggernaut was to emulate it. Smith used GM Europe to spearhead a move into the former Soviet Bloc, the first western automaker to do so. Its state-of-the-art plant in the East German town of Eisenach was first run by Chrysler LLC Vice Chairman Tom LaSorda, and Eisenach became the template GM replicated for a manufacturing expansion onto three continents. Smith cut the deal for GM to acquire Sweden's Saab Automobil AB, now near bankruptcy. He led GM into China, executed a troubled joint venture in Russia with the support of GM Europe and understood the value of using South Korea as a low-cost exporter long before rivals did. And Smith chose Adam Opel AG, GM's unit in Germany and a source of continued bickering between Europe and Detroit, to launch a global manufacturing push and to develop common engineering, purchasing and powertrain processes that would offset the struggling business back home. Not now, because it can't. The global recession is hammering European markets, too, increasing the likelihood that GM's overseas earnings cushion is going flat just when the Detroit automaker needs it most. Lose control of GM Europe, and the earnings hit could be worse. Worse, this is an opportunity for longtime critics inside GM Europe and, especially, Opel to engineer a break from the parent. GM bought Opel in 1929, watched as the Soviet army shipped Opel tooling back to Moscow after World War II and endured tiresome corporate infighting that reached a crescendo in the late 1990s. But resentments die hard, as I witnessed during a four-year stint covering the European industry from Germany. Just like Chrysler's 2007 collapse offered Daimler AG a chance to end its nine-year tie-up, an imperiled GM lobbying for European government aid is seen as an opportunity to reassert German control over the mass-market brand -- 80 years after losing it. This isn't what Jack envisioned. He's not the only one. Daniel Howes' column runs Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. He can be reached at (313) 222-2106, [email protected] or detnews.com/howes.